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Problems CONFRONTING Contemporary DEMOCRACIES

Essays in Honor of
Alfred Stepan



Edited by

Douglas Chalmers and Scott Mainwaring

University of Notre Dame Press
Notre Dame, Indiana

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Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
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Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Problems confronting contemporary democracies : essays in honor of Alfred Stepan / edited by Douglas Chalmers and Scott Mainwaring.
p. cm. — (From the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-268-02372-0 (cloth) — ISBN 978-0-268-08688-6 (e-book)
1. Democracy—History—20th century. 2. Stepan, Alfred C. I. Stepan, Alfred C. II. Chalmers, Douglas A. III. Mainwaring, Scott, 1954–
JC421.P764 2012
321.8—dc23

2012024902

∞ *The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.*

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people who undergo non-Orthodox conversions begun in Israel and formalized abroad. Piano, Puddington, and Rosenberg, *Freedom in the World 2006,* 355–56, 890, 892.

62. Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics,* 221.

63. Stepan articulates a variety of religion-state relationships, some of which meet the criterion of his twin tolerations and some of which do not. One that does not he calls "atheistic secularism imposed by the state." See Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics,* tables 11.1 and 11.2, 224–25.

64. Roderic Ai Camp, *Crossing Swords: Politics and Religion in Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 26–28, 36; Margaret Crahan, "Fidel Castro, the Catholic Church, and Revolution in Cuba," in *Church and Politics in Latin America,* ed. Dermot Keogh (London: Macmillan, 1990), 257–62; Demarath, *Crossing the Gods,* 151.

65. Camp, *Crossing Swords,* 36–39; Piano, Puddington, and Rosenberg, *Freedom in the World 2006,* 891.

66. Lucien O. Chauvin, "Thaw in Church-State Relations," *Latin America Press* 28, no. 44 (November 28, 1996): 1, 8; John M. Kirk, *Between God and the Party: Religion and Politics in Revolutionary Cuba* (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1989), 169–78; Jorge I. Domínguez, "International and National Aspects of the Catholic Church in Cuba," *Cuban Studies* 19 (1989): 43–60. According to the 2006 Freedom House report on Cuba, "security agents frequently spy on worshippers, the government continues to block construction of new churches, the number of foreign priests is limited, and most new denominations are refused recognition." Piano, Puddington, and Rosenberg, *Freedom in the World 2006,* 197.

67. Demerath, *Crossing the Gods,* 151–52; Richard Madsen, *China's Catholics: Tragedy and Hope in an Emerging Civil Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Pitman B. Potter, "Belief in Control: Regulation of Religion in China," *China Quarterly* 174 (June 2003): 317–37; Hanson, *Religion and Politics,* 168–70; Piano, Puddington, and Rosenberg, *Freedom in the World 2006,* 163.

68. Demerath, *Crossing the Gods,* 74–75; Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981).

69. Demerath, *Crossing the Gods,* 75–78; Sabrina Tavernise, "Governing Party Scores Big Victory in Turkish Vote," *New York Times,* July 23, 2007, A3; Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu, "Turkish Official with Islamic Ties Wins Presidency," *New York Times,* August 29, 2007, A1, A8; Piano, Puddington, and Rosenberg, *Freedom in the World 2006,* 891. The European Court of Human Rights has ruled repeatedly in favor of Turkey's barring of the headscarf as legal, and the current Muslim-based AK party in power in Turkey has not pushed for an easing of the ban in law. Piano, Puddington, and Rosenberg, *Freedom in the World 2006,* 731.

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Twin Tolerations or Siamese Twins?

Kemalist Laicism and Political Islam in Turkey

Murat Akan

Political Islam in Turkey has come a long way, from the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, banned by the Constitutional Court in 1971 for violating *laiklik,*[1] or laicity) to the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, banned by the military Junta in 1980 along with all political parties) to the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, banned by the Constitutional Court in 1998 for violating laiklik following a military warning against the party in 1997) to the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, banned by the Constitutional Court in 2001 for violating laiklik) to the split that took place within political Islam in 2001 with the formation of two political parties: the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi), which represents the radical wing, and the Justice and Development Party (JDP; Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which represents the moderate wing of political Islam. The JDP won two consecutive parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2007. In 2002 it won 34.28 percent of the vote and 363 seats of 550 in parliament, and it captured 46.58 percent of the vote and 341 seats in 2007. To underline the magnitude of the party's electoral success, let it suffice to say that in both parliaments the party had more seats than the 330 votes (three-fifths majority) required for approving a constitutional change, and in the 2002 parliament it was only two votes short of the

367 votes (two-thirds majority) required to overturn a presidential veto on a proposal for constitutional change. In 2008 the head prosecutor of the republic indicted JDP for violating laiklik. The Constitutional Court decided not to close the party but cut half its public funding and issued a warning. This chapter offers an analysis of some concrete policies and public statements of the Justice and Development Party in the press and in parliamentary discussions and evaluates what they mean for the relation of religion and politics in Turkey.

The European and Turkish press, academics, and public intellectuals have taken the electoral success of JDP without a subsequent intervention by the military, the pro-European union position the party has taken in contrast to the previous parties of political Islam, its participation in the Alliance of Civilizations Project,[2] and the lack of references to Shari'a law in speeches by party members (in contrast to the speeches by members of the Welfare Party) as concrete evidence for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Furthermore, the JDP era has been taken as an example of how strict secularism and consolidation of democracy are not complementary projects. In the current world context where it is quite popular to associate Islam with violence, JDP has been taken as an example for the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

This article reevaluates this celebrated moment in Turkish politics from two different angles present in Alfred Stepan's work on democratic consolidation: the "twin tolerations" argument in his article "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the 'Twin Tolerations'"[3] and the "nation-state policy" angle in his book coauthored with Juan J. Linz, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.*[4] Empirical evidence presented here from these two angles portrays Turkish politics as being much more complicated than the celebrated "success" narrative reiterated above. The JDP religion policy and nation-state policy fit much better with what Stepan calls "organic statism" in his book *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective*[5] than with a democratic pattern. From these two angles, I offer an analysis of Turkish politics at critical moments in the past two decades with comparisons to the early times of the Turkish Republic. My main argument is that the more the Justice and Development Party has established a powerful place in

Turkish politics, the more it has reproduced the "organic statist" politics of the Kemalist military-civilian establishment via religion policy and nation-state policy. This co-optation is most visible from the vantage point of minorities—Armenians, Alevis,[6] Kurds, and women—in Turkey. I focus mainly on political events and state policies concerning Alevis and Armenians, and only briefly on those related to Kurds and women. As a conclusion, I discuss the relevance of this empirical thesis for Stepan's twin tolerations.

Theoretical Frameworks of Evaluation

Angle 1: State-Religion Relations and Democratic Consolidation

In "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy," Stepan took a step beyond Eurocentrism by recapitulating the lessons to be drawn from the European experience of secularization. To gather all the diverse institutional arrangements regulating the relation between states and religions in Europe under the concept of separation of church and state is empirically incorrect, and it hides more than it reveals. "The 'lesson' from Western Europe," Stepan writes, "lies not in church-state separation but in the constant political construction and reconstruction of the 'twin tolerations,'"[7] namely, the boundary of the freedom of the state from religion and the freedom of religion from the state. Stepan lists ten institutional requirements of democracy[8] and then articulates the boundary between state and religion as follows:

> The key area of autonomy that must be established for democratic institutions is that the institutions that emanate from democratic procedures should be able, within the bounds of the constitution and human rights, to generate policies. Religious institutions should not have constitutionally privileged prerogatives which allow them authoritatively to mandate public policy to democratically elected governments. The key area of autonomy—from the government or even from other religions—that must be established for religious freedom is that individuals and religious communities, consistent

> with our core institutional definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to worship privately. More: as individuals and groups, they should also be able to publically advance their values in civil society, and to sponsor organizations and movements in political society, as long as their public advancement of these beliefs does not impinge negatively on the liberties of other citizens, or violate democracy and the law, by violence.[9]

By underscoring the multivocality of all religious traditions, Stepan shifted the focus from Huntington's trend of reducing the problems of democracy in the world to a "Muslim" problem to a focus on institutional problems and solutions beyond religious essentialism via the "twin tolerations" articulated in the above quotation. Stepan's emphasis on multivocality opposes the idea of a unique "essence" for each religion on which Huntington's religious-civilizational approach is grounded. In explicating multivocality, based on his interviews with some Islamic leaders, Stepan contrasts the mobilization of Koranic concepts for a nondemocratic vision of politics with concepts such as *shura* (consultation), *ijtihad* (independent reasoning), and *ijma* (consensus), which, he argues, can be mobilized for a democratic vision of politics. Stepan concludes as follows:

> What should we conclude from this brief discussion? It seems valid to conclude that contemporary Islamic leaders have "usable" elements to draw from in their doctrine, culture, and experience with which to construct a nondemocratic vision of a desired future polis. But, there are also other contemporary leaders who have "usable" elements of Islamic doctrine, culture, and experience with which to attempt to support, or construct, a democratic vision of their desired future polis. The tradition is multivocal.[10]

Here, Stepan turns away from Huntington's cultural essentialism. But he goes further than just showing variations within a culture. He shares José Casanova's emphasis on "the practical advantages that accrue when actors are able to offer traditional religious legitimation for modern developments."[11]

Stepan's research agenda on religion and democracy assigns a crucial role to the reexamination of the place Turkish politics has held in the literature on democratization and secularization. In a 2003 article with Graeme C. Robertson, "An 'Arab' More than a 'Muslim' Democracy Gap," Stepan and Robertson argue that relative to their GDP per capita, non-Arab-Muslim-majority countries are "democratic overachievers" in contested elections.[12] The authors set an empirical framework that takes Turkey from its celebrated position as the unique example of democratization through contested elections in a Muslim-majority country and requalify it, not as a unique case, but as the longest-lasting one. In the 2001 article cited above, Stepan sees Turkey falling under "nondemocratic patterns of religious-state relations."[13] He suggests that state measures taken in Turkey in the name of secularization far exceed those taken even by France, which historically has had the most radical separation of religious and state institutions in Europe. In these two articles, Stepan argued for an analytical and empirical separation of the processes of secularization and democratization as a challenge to the "no secularism, no democracy"[14] thesis that is the prevailing understanding of the relationship between secularization and democratization in the social sciences.

Angle 2: Nation-State Policy and Democratic Consolidation

In *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* Linz and Stepan "mean by a consolidated democracy a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become the 'the only game in town.'"[15] They take a modern state as a prerequisite for democracy, because "democracy is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus, without a state, no modern democracy is possible. . . . [A]n intense lack of identification with the state . . . raises fundamental and often unsolvable problems."[16]

While Linz and Stepan highlight "an intense lack of identification" with the state as a hindrance to democratic consolidation, they argue that an excessive identification with the state can be a hindrance to democratic consolidation as well. They emphasize that too much identification with the state by a certain group in society, a majority or a minority, or a demand from the citizens by the state for identification for

the purpose of homogenization, which they call "nation-state policy,"[17] is at odds with democratic policy in a society composed of diverse interests, identities, and political goals—for example, as I understand them, ethnic, religious, national, economic, gender, or intellectual diversity.

The Overarching Angle: Religion Policy and Nation-State Policy as Makers of Organic Statism

In his chapter, "Liberal-Pluralist, Classic Marxist, and 'Organic-Statist' Approaches to the State," in *The State and Society,* Stepan positions "organic-statism" as an antiliberal and anti-Marxist, in other words, a third way, approach to the state. He argues that this approach offered a more accurate conceptualization of the states in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s than the liberal and the Marxist approaches. The particular form that organic statism took at the time in Latin America was corporatism:

> My working hypothesis is that many of the political elites in Latin America have in fact responded to their perceptions of impending crises of modernization and control by invoking, in a variety of modern forms, many of the central ideas of the organic-statist, non-liberal, non-Marxist model of state-society relations described here, and have attempted to use the power of the state to forge regimes with marked corporatist characteristics.[18]

Stepan offered a fivefold definition of "organic statism": (1) "the starting point is normative—the preferred form of political life of man as a member of a community"; (2) it "emphasize[s] the ends of government and . . . [is] less concerned with procedural guarantees"; (3) "since the common good can be known by 'right reason,' there is no need for a process whereby interest groups express their opinion and preferences in order for the leaders of the state to 'know' what the common good is"; (4) "rejection of the legitimacy of 'private interests'"; and (5) "rejection of class conflict in favor of a harmonious community."[19]

He articulated the relation between "organic statism" and "corporatism" as follows:

> Organic statism is a normative approach to politics that can also be formulated as an abstract model of governance. . . . Corporatism refers to a particular set of policies and institutional arrangements for structuring interest representation. . . . While organic statism and corporatism refer to different things, organic statism is sometimes connected as a guide to corporatist policies, more often as a rationale, and frequently as a combination of a guide and rationale.[20]

I will not engage in a discussion on the links between corporatism and fascism here. There is plenty of well-researched scholarly work, including Stepan's, that sets certain types of corporatism as conceptual and analytical frameworks for research separate from fascism.[21] I will not engage with this literature except to underscore that Taha Parla and Andrew Davison have written extensively on Kemalism's original content as an ideology,[22] of which Kemalist laicism is a subset, and particularly on how Kemalism "strongly emphasize[s] solidaristic corporatism . . . [and] also incorporate[s] partially fascistic characteristics here and there."[23] I will stick with the wider analytical framework of organic statism, which utilizes not only corporatism but also nation-state policy and religion policy, and helps capture a wider range of antiliberal and antisocialist tendencies of various degrees. It also helps to underscore how both Kemalist ideology and political Islam in Turkey are third way organic-statist ideologies.

The offshoot of corporatism in the sphere of Kemalist laicism is the state mobilization of religion as a cement of society in order to bring to life at least elements (1), (4), and (5) and partially (2) and (3) in Stepan's above definition of organic statism. In the following pages, I first show, through analyses of parliamentary debates from the past two decades, that radical Islam (Welfare Party), Moderate Islam (Justice and Development Party), and Republican Left (Democratic Left Party) all put religion at the service of the state, thus contributing to organic statism. Second, through an analysis of Turkish politics from the assassination of Hrant Dink, editor in chief of *Agos,* the only Armenian weekly in Turkish, on January 19, 2007, until the parliamentary elections of July 2007, I show how nationalism at the state and society levels contribute to organic statism. My analysis provides further support through

contemporary evidence for the thesis that Parla and Davison defend in "Secularism and Laicism in Turkey." They argue, with evidence predating the rise of the JDP, "The issue in Turkey is not secularist Kemalist generals and intellectuals versus religious fundamentalists and reactionaries. It is, rather, limited laicist Kemalists Muslims versus other Islamo-political groups."[24]

Before I delve into the original contemporary evidence to be evaluated in this chapter, I would like to offer a brief historical analytical overview of laicism in the Turkish context for readers who are not familiar with Turkish politics.

A Historical-Analytical Overview of Laicism in the Turkish Context: The Roots and Branches of Kemalist Laicism

The Roots

Kemalist laicism at its roots and in its contemporary forms is anticlerical but not antireligious. The statement that "Kemalism is not being without a religion" is present in all the constitutive documents of the Turkish Republic and is a commonly uttered defense of Kemalist republicans against political Islamists in public discussions today and in the past. This is a polemical defense, a manifestation of Kemalist pragmatism in a country where religion has always been constitutive of the social fabric and where religious populism has worked as a source of vote for right and center-right political parties. In this context, an explicit public position against religion has been politically costly. It is also an articulation that accurately defines the institutional arrangement regulating the relationship of the state and religion in Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's most explicit and repeated statement on religion in the 1920s and 1930s was on preventing religion from becoming "a tool for politics." To reach this goal, the management of religious affairs was put under a state institution, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). The directorate has privileged Sunni Islam, leaving out non-Muslims and non-Sunni forms of Islam, and it put Sunni Islam at the service of building a homogenous nation-state. Through the directorate, the Turkish state has always made a claim on what the "right" religion in Turkey is, and this claim has taken mild as well as violent forms. This particular institutionalization of state and religion relations in the early years of the republic was subservient to the higher and main goal that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk set for himself and his Republican Peoples Party, namely, to "raise Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization." The path to "contemporary civilization" passed through dismantling the institutions of the Ottoman Empire and building the nation-state. In the 1920s, the abolition of the Sultanate, the Caliphate, and the Shari'a were the major moves that disestablished the political and religious wings of the empire. Popular sovereignty, a civil code, the advocacy of positive science, and the union of education were the main constitutive of elements of the republican regime. Viewed through this lens of a regime change, the source of political legitimacy had changed; there was a laicist practice at the regime level. Yet the place and role of religion in the new nation-state displayed quite a bit of continuity with its place and role in the empire. In both the empire and then the republic, Sunni Islam was the social cement of the political body. By paying the salaries of the clerics through the DRA, the state created religious personnel faithful to the republic. This was precisely how some Republicans perceived the paying of the salaries of the clerics in the Third French Republic before the separation of church and state in 1905—as a way of controlling them, for any cleric who spoke against the republican regime could be fired.

These developments in Turkey did not follow a democratic path, nor was democracy one of the six arrows of Kemalism. The six arrows were nationalism, populism, statism, laicism, republicanism, and transformationism. Kemalism in its content, defined by these six arrows, was a third way ideology, neither liberal nor socialist, but best described by Parla and Davison in *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* as a form of corporatism. The roots of corporatism in Kemalism came from Ziya Gökalp, the most systematic nationalist thinker. He was the first chair of sociology at Istanbul University and a member of parliament in the first parliament of the republic who was influenced by Émile Durkheim. Within the organicism of corporatism that prioritized the cohesiveness of the whole over the individual and economic

classes, religion found its place as a contributor to the "cohesiveness" of society, where "cohesiveness" did not have any democratic connotations. Yet in all fairness to Gökalp, Parla and Davison underline the elements of universalism in Gökalp "who, even as a corporatist, envisioned 'civilization' as a shared sphere in which all nations participate in a common whole,"[25] while Kemalism as an ideology promoted the superiority of the Turkish nation over all other nations. In sum, the roots of Kemalist laicism were embedded in the pursuit of the level of contemporary civilization via a regime change from empire to the nation-state with a corporatist strategy.

The Branches

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died in 1938, and the Republican Peoples Party stayed in power until 1950, when it lost in the first competitive elections ever held in Turkey to the Democrat Party. In 1937 the six arrows of Kemalism were constitutionalized, and the constitution explicitly declared Turkey as laic. The antiminority policies of the Republican state in building a homogeneous nation-state culminated in the Dersim massacre of citizens of Kurdish origin in 1938,[26] and the Directorate of Religious Affairs stayed intact. The emergence of the multiparty system in 1945 was a big turning point in the religious policy of the Republican Peoples Party. The rising opposition based part of its platform on a criticism of the Republican Peoples Party for having kept the infrastructure for religion in the country underdeveloped. Although the DRA was intact, it remained small in size. Faced with this opposition platform and fearing a loss of power, the Republican Peoples Party turned toward increasing the budget of the directorate, reintroducing optional Sunni-centered courses on religion in public education, and reopening the schools for the education of *imams*. The party justified the change in policy by maintaining that the republican regime was consolidated; that is, there was no risk of a counterrevolution. Therefore, investing in the infrastructure of religion was not against republican principles but, to the contrary, was crucial for bringing up youth faithful to the republic. It supported this position with examples from European countries where, some members of the party argued, religion

was still a vibrant force in the social fabric. In the face of competition for a religious electorate, the Republican Peoples Party's pragmatism precluded a full commitment to laicism as a state policy in daily politics and limited laicism to the question of the regime. This circumstantial move to strengthen infrastructure in religion was not the last instance of its kind in Turkey; later sections of this chapter present concrete examples from the past two decades. The most significant push for religious infrastructure came from the military itself, which is the self-declared heir of Kemalism. The military's actions in this respect underscored one more time that Kemalist laicism in Turkey embraces state mobilization of religion as a cement of society. In the 1980 military takeover, the military, exactly like its counterparts in Latin America, repressed left movements and organizations. The military-written 1982 constitution explicitly offered religion as a bulwark against left-wing politics by reemphasizing the role of the directorate in maintaining national solidarity and in introducing required religion courses in public education. During the writing of the constitution, some statements explicitly denied the existence of minorities in Turkey and emphasized that religion would undercut left politics.

The center of the political spectrum moved even further to the right in the aftermath of military rule from 1980 to 1983. The president of the republic was a military officer until 1989, though the first competitive elections were held in 1983. Religious conservative political parties gained momentum in this context. The military's next major appearance on the scene was in 1997, when the National Security Council issued a warning against the coalition government of which the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) was a partner and Necmettin Erbakan was the prime minister. On the surface of the intervention against Refah Partisi were the speeches of Necmettin Erbakan, which included elements of violence and explicit suggestions for a "multi-juridical system."[27] In the background was the rise of Muslim capital via investments from religious citizens in the form of profit sharing.[28] One of the major outcomes of this episode that started with a military warning and ended with a Constitutional Court decision closing down Refah Partisi on grounds of being the focal point of anti-laic activities was the military's imposition on the subsequent government of an increase in the length of

compulsory primary education from five to eight years as a way to fight political Islam. Yet the state's educational infrastructure was not sufficient to deal with an expansion from five to eight years. Whatever the intentions were, the result was the fracturing of the main—historically speaking—constitutive institution of laicism, free and compulsory public education. By this hurried imposition, the National Security Council, the self-appointed defender of Kemalist laicism, contributed to a state policy that surpassed existing state capacity in education and prepared the grounds for the privatization of primary education, hence contributing to the cutting off of the major root of laicism. The number of private primary schools in Turkey doubled, from 335 schools in the 1996–97 school year, just before the military warning in 1997 and the hurried impositions on the subsequent government in 1998, to 669 schools in the 1998–99 school year.[29]

One of the founding texts of political Islam in Turkey is a book by Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Welfare Party, titled *Milli Görüş* (National Perspective). Published in 1975, this book explicitly defines political Islam as a third way ideology in opposition to liberalism and socialism, exactly the same ideological place that, according to Parla and Davison, Kemalism claims in its official documents.[30] The current prime minister, Tayyip Erdoğan of the Justice and Development Party government, has stated on multiple public occasions that religion is the cement of society, a statement which also has Kemalist versions. Since the party came to power in 2002, it has steadily increased the budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The 2009 budget of the directorate was 2.4 billion New Turkish Liras, more than the amount allocated for institutions of social policy and even more than some ministries. The privatization of education has benefited among others the Fethullah Gülen religious community, whose schools are flourishing in Turkey as well as in Iraq, Africa, Europe, North America, Central America, South America, Central Asia, and some post-Soviet Republics (some have denied permission to these schools on grounds of secularism). Kemalist laicist scholars and politicians, including the left-wing republican Bülent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left Party, who passed away in 2006, have expressed in writing their appreciation of Gülen schools.[31]

Is Turkey Democratizing?

Justice and Development Party Politics from the Angle of the "Twin Tolerations"

Stepan's "twin tolerations" framework analytically differentiates processes of secularization and democratization and explicitly problematizes their relationship rather than reducing one to the other. This framework can help produce a critical analysis of Turkish politics because the modernist accounts of Turkish politics are precisely built on an analytical conflation of these two processes.[32] In the nonmodernist accounts—namely, accounts that do not assume a directly proportional relationship between modernization, secularization, and democracy—the decoupled nature of Turkish modernization and secularization (modernization and secularization from above) from local agents is the key and oldest problem. For instance, Şerif Mardin, in his classic 1973 article, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,"[33] and Çağlar Keyder, in a 1997 article, "Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s,"[34] both address this decoupled nature of modernization and secularization in Turkey from local agents. At the same time, because Turkish politics is a quintessential example in which the relationship between the processes of modernization, secularization, and democracy is the key problem, it offers a context to evaluate the twin tolerations framework.

In the twin tolerations article, Stepan regarded Turkey as a case of "nondemocratic patterns of religious-state relations." He analyzed the existence of Turkey's Directorate of Religious Affairs, which pays the salaries of clerics, defends a particular version of Islam, and currently employs close to 85,000 clerics.

> One often reads or hears allusions to Atatürk's secularism being influenced by, and modeled on, French secularism. However, from the evidence I have given, it should be clear that France in 1905 never assumed this degree of state management of religion. For Western observers to defend Atatürk's version of military controlled religious education as "French type secular democracy" is a

> complete misreading of secularism in the West, even in France in 1905, much less in 1959, and certainly a misreading of a democratically normal separation of religion and state.[35]

The question I would like to pose is whether the Justice and Development Party has presented a substantial democratic challenge to the militaristic state management of religion in Turkey and moved toward, or has potential to move toward, a democratic pattern of religion-state relations, toward "twin tolerations." I will answer this question through public statements, statements in parliamentary debates, and the party's actual and proposed policies.

JDP Politics of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Historical Perspective

Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan summarized the JDP's position on laiklik on December 12, 2005, six days before the parliamentary discussion of the 2006 budget of the DRA: "Religion is the cement of society."[36] During the discussion in parliament on December 18, 2005, the JDP's position on two issues suggest the particular nature of that cement: the proposal to give Alevis as well as Sunnis representation in the DRA and the proposal to strengthen the existing structure of DRA particularly against Christian missionaries.

First, the Republican Peoples Party (RPP) spokesperson argued during the parliamentary session of December 18, 2005, that the DRA should also recognize Alevis and have Alevi representatives as part of its institutional structure, and that a state budget should be provided for the group:

> The Directorate of Religious Affairs is an important institution.... We [RPP] value it more than you [JDP] do, but this institution has to contribute to the happiness of people.... You are pushing a significant portion of society into spiritual/psychological depression.... There is depression in all parts of society.... The [Alevis] have to be represented within the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and *cemevis* [Alevi places of worship] have to be given a legal status. You are not giving them a dime. These people are paying taxes to the state, but with these taxes we are supporting a single sect [Sunni].[37]

In his response, the Justice and Development Party spokesperson dismissed the RPP spokesperson's demand for representation for Alevis within DRA by reiterating, perhaps ironically, the exact Kemalist laicist argument in defense of the DRA:

> Mr. President and esteemed parliamentarians, the fundamental goals of the Directorate of Religious Affairs are to enlighten society on matters of religion, to provide people with solid [religious] knowledge based on the fundamental sources of religion by a method that does not disregard modern life, ... and to maintain fidelity to religion and to the state, love and unity of the nation, positive values of the contemporary world, and societal agreement.... The Directorate of Religious Affairs is an institution that represents all Muslims by being equidistant on the basis of citizenship and not discriminating on the basis of sect, understanding, or religious practice.... Islam is a universal religion.... Therefore, not only does it represent all Muslims by being indifferent to ethnicity, its fundamental principle serves as an umbrella for all those who feel Muslim and believe in the religion of Islam, regardless of religious sect, character, or religious order, be it Alevi or Sunni.... Dear Friends, because I know our Alevi brothers, ... in all their aspects, I see them as Muslim brothers of mine. Because we have accepted Hz. Ali as most respectable, we do not have the slightest doubt that ... those who follow on the path of Hz. Ali ... are Muslims.... Our Republican Peoples Party spokesperson mentioned here that Alevis are not represented in the Directorate of Religious Affairs and that *cemevleri* [Alevi places of worship] are not recognized as mosques, as places of worship.... Dear Friends, in fact, because the Directorate of Religious Affairs represents all Muslims, our mosques are not the places of worship ... of any one particular sect. They are the common places of worship of all Muslims.[38]

I would like to emphasize two points from this discussion in parliament. First, the above references to the content of the religion of Islam as universal and compatible with modernity by the JDP are very much reminiscent of the statement in the early days of the republic by Mustafa Kemal and his supporters. On many occasions, Mustafa Kemal

praised Islam as being the most rational religion. For instance, in January 1923 he stated, "Our religion is the most reasonable and most natural religion, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been the last religion. In order for a religion to be natural, it should conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our religion is totally compatible with these."[39] Or, as Mustafa Kemal's minister of exterior articulated in a speech during the discussions on the abolishment of the Caliphate in parliament on March 3, 1924:

> In Islam, as opposed to Christianity, there is no clergy; in other words there is no clerical government. . . . All the civilized world has been advancing on the path to progress. Are we going to be left behind? . . . How odd! It would be very odd if we were left behind when the Religion of Islam is so noble and so progressive. . . . The nation cannot be represented. . . . The nation says that it will manage its own affairs. . . . This is what *Kuran-ı Kerim* insists on. It says that Muslims manage their own affairs among themselves with consultation *[shura]*.[40]

The parallel between contemporary statements by JDP members and statements by Republicans in the 1920s is precisely the compatibility of Islam and modernity, or, in the words of Casanova, the offering of "religious legitimation for modern developments." This similarity between strictly antipluralist early republican ideology and the JDP position casts doubt on the commonly made dichotomy between Kemalist laicism and political Islam that dominates the studies of Turkish politics. It also disqualifes the current politics of Islam in Turkey as a new moment.

Second, while it is widely acknowledged that the institution privileges a Sunni version of Islam, the defense of the DRA by the JDP in qualifying it as an institution above sects is reminiscent of the early and late Republican strategy of putting Islam through the DRA to the assimilationist task of building a homogeneous society. Furthermore, the JDP spokesperson quoted above explains the purpose of the DRA with exactly the same vocabulary—"maintain fidelity to religion and to the state, love and unity of the nation"—as the Kemalist military officers who wrote the 1982 constitution. This similarity in the commitment to the DRA casts yet another doubt on the Kemalist laicism/political Islam dichotomy that dominates the studies of Turkish politics.

During the December 18, 2005, parliamentary session on the budget for the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the JDP spokesperson further pointed out that Christian missionary activities in the world were an imminent danger. He said the main problem concerning the DRA was its weakness due to the vacancies among the institution's cadres. He noted that some mosques did not even have a cadre:

> Dear Friends, you all know that in recent years in Turkey, as in all over the world, Christian missionaries have worked very intensely. At a time when the world promotes basic rights and freedoms, we need to provide the conditions for those from any belief to freely communicate their beliefs. Yet the . . . competition is working to the disadvantage of Muslims, as evidenced by intense propaganda of missionaries in Muslim countries and the financial support of the Union of Churches. Dialogue between religions and the elimination of conflict among them is applaudable, yet the competition among religions will last as long as the world exists. Competition can develop only under equal conditions and opportunities. Muslims must undertake more innovative activities. I believe that it is much more beneficial in the long run that these activities be within the standards of science and justice. Therefore, the number of expert cadres of the High Council of Religious Affairs of the Directorate of Religious Affairs must be increased. We need to conduct research on Abrahamic religions under the directorship of the Directorate of Religious Affairs with the cooperation of a few well-staffed Faculties of Theology.[41]

This statement opens yet another angle on the contemporary dialogue and alliance of civilizations visions that dominate world politics. Visions of tolerance and mutual understanding may be the facade of competition among religious missionaries. The analogy between capitalism and religion has continued relevance: all capitalists, despite their explicit commitments to free competition, deep inside strive for monopoly, and likewise, all religions, despite their explicit commitments to toleration, deep inside would like all to convert to their side.



Figure 13.1 The Actual Budget of the Directorate of Religious Affairs as a Percentage of the Actual State Budget Spent
Source: Calculated from Turkish Statistical Yearbook.

The above discussions in parliament during the December 18, 2005, session on the budget of the DRA was one snapshot of JDP politics regarding the DRA, the general trajectory of which is summarized in figures 13.1 and 13.2 below. The JDP has continuously increased the share of the DRA in the state budget (fig. 13.1), finally to a level that has surpassed the peak share that the Welfare Party (WP)—the party of radical Islam—had allocated to the institution in 1997.[42]

The 2007 budget of the DRA under the JDP has surpassed the share of thirty-seven other state institutions.[43] In 2007 the DRA received more state funds than the Social Services and Child Protection Institution, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Forest and the Environment, and the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement. With the 15,000 new cadres the JDP secured for the institution in March 2007, the DRA enjoys the largest staff it has ever



Figure 13.2 Number of Employees at the Directorate of Religious Affairs
Source: Directorate of Religious Affairs.

had since the founding of the Republic, even larger than it was when the Welfare Party was in government, in 1997 (fig. 13.2).

The JDP has embraced the DRA, a republican institution in its origins, yet to qualify this embrace as political Islamist would be historically wrong. For although the DRA was kept dormant with a low budget after its establishment in 1924 until the late 1940s, the coming of the multiparty system in 1946 facilitated a shift in the Republican vision of its tasks. Fearing a loss of power through political competition in the new multiparty system, the Republicans moved to arm the DRA by increasing its budget in 1949 in order to substitute moral ties for political ties. The Republican rationale for this investment in the DRA was discussed widely at the Seventh Congregation of the Republican Peoples Party in 1947. At this meeting, a member of the Republican Peoples Party issued a statement that captures the Republican spirit for investing in the DRA at the time:

> Friends, by keeping religious affairs separate from state affairs and politics and by granting complete freedom of conscience to the citizens, the article that is the object of debate does not satisfy our needs today. Today, the Turkish Nation and Turkish youth need spiritual nutrition. In nations deprived of spiritual nutrition and

that worship only material things, preventing immorality has never been possible. In these cases humanity and society have fallen into mischief. History proves this and provides the most powerful evidence. Friends, people who worship only material things, and a human being deprived of spiritual existence, . . . do not think of anything except spending their days with pleasure. But if you look at their conscience, their masks fall and their inner state of terror is revealed. Humanity has to embrace the spiritual ties of religion at all levels; as an individual, as a community, as a nation. How will individuals embrace these spiritual ties and from where will they provide for these needs?

Friends, let me speak frankly; we will find the means of satisfying this need only in the laws of morality approved by the religion of Islam [Applause]. These laws of morality will take this nation to the right path; today, those immoralities complained of everywhere and all the time will be prevented. Most respected friends, inspiring spiritual nutrition to human beings is possible only through religion. Training the spirit is not possible outside religion because religion curbs cruel and tyrannical feelings and bad inclinations in human beings, society and individual need religion.

Friends, after having accepted that embracing spiritual ties is necessary, I would like to say one thing briefly. As we can see, after the end of the war, radio stations in the United States and in Europe are incessantly broadcasting religious conferences, churches are filled over capacity.[44]

This long quotation from the speech of a Republican Peoples Party member in 1947 is an excellent example of the antimaterialism (and the consequent antisocialism) of Kemalism. At the time the speech was given, this spirit was heightened by fear of communism during the Cold War, but according to Parla and Davison, the party also embraced this antimaterialism in its official documents in the 1920s and 1930s.[45] The above republican speech advocates moral ties instead of political ties, foreshadowing the public statement of Prime Minister Erdoğan on December 12, 2005, six days before the above discussions in parliament: "Religion is the cement of society."

Moreover, a close comparative analysis of the parliamentary debates at the other two crucial moments of figure 13.1—the discussions on the budget of the DRA during the coalition government led by the Welfare Party in 1997 and during the coalition government of the Democratic Left Party (DLP in the figure) in 2001—shows some similarities between political parties on the rationale of the politics of the DRA. During the December 13, 2000, discussion of the 2001 budget of the DRA in parliament, the spokesperson for the Democratic Left Party introduced the position of the party on the DRA as follows:

For the religion of Islam . . . the world is a means while the love of God and the concomitant eternal happiness is an end. Religion is at the heart of the people and not in the monopoly of politics. Islam is the common belief of our society. Islam is a religion grounded on love. If today our mosques are open and we can easily hear the call to prayer and can pray freely, we should not forget that it is thanks to the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the *laik* and democratic republican state that he established. Therefore, in all the regions [of Turkey], particularly in the Eastern and South Eastern regions, it is crucial to organize conferences, in cooperation with universities, in religious and national institutions. We cannot save on the defense of the nation and on fulfilling the requirements of the Koran and religion. Especially in the East and the South East, we should not leave mosques empty [without an imam], and appoint religious personnel with a high education. Recent history shows us how these vacant mosques are put to use by enemies of [our] religion and nation. Great duties fall upon the Directorate of Religious Affairs to straighten these unfavorable conditions.[46]

The spokesperson continued with an argument that the Turkish translation of the Koran has to be distributed more widely in Turkey so that people can learn the true religion and be protected against abuses of religion. Only in this way is it possible "to save in a truthful and scientific way our society and particularly our youth [from ignorance]. . . . For this program to be successful important duties fall upon the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the National Ministry of Education."[47]

This position was similar to the concerns and comments put forth by the spokesperson of the Virtue Party, the party of radical political Islam founded by the members of the Welfare Party after the latter was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1999. After underlining that the DRA was understaffed and that some mosques in Turkey did not have religious personnel, he stressed that religion is the cement of society:

> Some values are common to all society. . . . Religion is the first of these common values, most probably the most important one, and the common element of all the people in this country. In other words, it is the common element of each one of us in this parliament. No one can claim exclusive property over religion. If she or he does, harmony will be disrupted in the management and the ruling of society and depression/crisis will result. . . . It [religion] is the common property of all parties right to left. . . . The Directorate of Religious Affairs has to view society from this perspective.[48]

The Virtue Party spokesperson concluded by stating that if the Directorate of Religious Affairs is weak, then "illegal religious activities will flourish." The spokesperson for the National Action Party—the party of the radical nationalist right—also repeated the same theme by stating that "all nations have religion as the core of their culture." He continued: "The budget allocated for the Directorate of Religious Affairs is not sufficient to deliver its sevices in an effective and productive way. . . . It [the DRA] has to be restructured according to current ser - vice needs by issuing a law for its reorganization."

The December 12, 1996, parliamentary discussions on the 1997 budget of the Directorate during the coalition government led by the Welfare Party was not any different with regard to the role attributed to the directorate. The Welfare Party spokesperson made the following speech:

> Dear friends, faith is an important resource for the tranquility of society. Imagine that the 70 million are a faithless crowd. I guess all of you would agree that there would be no tranquility and order left. Therefore, instead of opposing religion, the most rational path is to make peace with religion, to love it and to purify it from falsehoods. . . . Therefore, it is self-evident that the Directorate of Religious Affairs has to be a part of the state administration and a state budget be allocated for it. . . . A law for its organization has to be issued right away. With this law, the Directorate of Religious Affairs has to be removed from the slippery influence of politics. . . . In short, the Directorate has to be made autonomous. . . . *Cemevi* is not an alternative to mosques, it is a place of gathering and conversation. . . . The Directorate of Religious Affairs serves all Muslims equally in Turkey; it is not under the rule of any religious sect or order; it embraces and guides all of them. . . . One of the fundamental duties of the state is to make the necessary arrangements for individuals to learn, live, and spread their basic rights. Therefore, it is a pedagogical, psychological, and sociological necessity that religious education and instruction in our schools start at a very early age. . . . Today, if we look at Europe and the United States and observe the bad habits we all reject such as alcohol, gambling, prostitution, and their consequences such as murder, divorce, and deadly disease such as AIDS, we realize how much of a blessing our Holy religion Islam and the family structure built upon it is. . . . The Directorate of Religious Affairs has an important role. The Directorate is also effective for fighting terrorism, divisive political currents and all kinds of harmful currents of ideas. . . . The budget of the Directorate we are discussing has been increased 25% compared to last year. . . . This is marvelous. . . . Due to the very important duties we expect from the Directorate we need to increase it [its budget] more.[49]

All three political parties see the DRA as a tool for substituting the "right" religio-moral ties for political ties and mobilizing the "right" religion as a solution to structural problems, all falling within a tradition of organic statism, particularly elements (1), (4), and (5) in Stepan's definition.

Returning to the December 18, 2005, session of the parliament, we can see the rich comparative remarks made on European countries and Turkey. For instance, a JDP member made the following comparison with Europe:

> This organization [DRA] which is providing religious services on five continents of the world through its international representatives does not only serve the Turks in those countries but also serves all people who would like to learn about Islam. On October 3, 2005, we entered the starting period of the negotiations with the European Union. The strongest and most organized institutions of Europe are still churches and religious endowments. The financial and spiritual power of these institutions is nearly stronger than the states' budgets, and their spiritual authority and influence are stronger than those of heads of states. Although they are laic, according to the constitutions of strong European Union countries Germany, France, Italy, and England, laws contrary to Christian dogma cannot be proposed. . . . In order for our country to endure against Christian institutions with strong and rooted organizations, we have to evaluate and strengthen these three basic institutions to the best of our ability: . . . Ministry of Culture[,] . . . Ministry of Education[,] [and] . . . Directorate of Religious Affairs.[50]

These references to the persisting role of religion in Europe, despite the fact that some are inaccurate, have to be taken seriously. On the one hand, they are simple political rhetoric. References from within political Islam in Turkey to the diversity of relations between the state and religion in European countries started with the Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan in a more systematic and grounded way than the JDP statement above.[51] In a pamphlet in 1994, the Welfare Party demanded a constitutional amendment, specifically calling for the elimination of the term *laik* from Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution. The party had often called Europe a "Christian Club" but then diverged from its anti-Western stance in the 1970s[52] and engaged in a comparative analysis of European constitutions. In order to argue for the constitutional amendment in Turkey, the Welfare Party pamphlet used French exceptionalism—that it is the only European country with the term *laïque* in its constitution. It also cited the fact that Norway, Greece, Denmark, and England have constitutionally established churches, and emphasized that every individual has a right to religious instruction in Germany. In other words, a party of "radical political Islam" that had been banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court, and whose closure was sanctioned by the European Court of Human Rights, once used and bequeathed a strategy of "turning to the West" or "westernism." Such comparisons with European countries look more like pragmatic political attempts and do not necessarily signal or constitute moves toward democratization in Turkey.

On the other hand, such references have a different significance in light of the persisting role of religion in Europe and the current state-led restructuring in state-religion relations under way in many European countries.[53] Such examples include the Shari'a courts established in the United Kingdom in 2008, the corporatist French Muslim Council forged by Nicolas Sarkozy, and the plan articulated in Sarkozy's book *Republic, Religions, and Hope* for advocating religious morality as the cement of society to demobilize impoverished masses in the French ghettos.[54] They attain additional significance and give birth to interesting hypotheses. This additional significance was put forward best at the first Alliance of Civilizations meeting. The press release issued after the fourth meeting of the Alliance of Civilizations in Istanbul, held November 12–13, 2006, was titled "Politics, not Religion, at the Heart of the Growing Muslim-West Divide, New Report Argues." The title led one to believe that a shift from a religiously based understanding of the problems of the world order to a political understanding was taking place.[55] But the report cites religion among its guiding principles for a solution: "Religion is an increasingly important dimension of many societies and a significant source of values for individuals. It can play a critical role in promoting an appreciation of other cultures, religions, and ways of life to help build harmony among them."[56] Read from the perspective of "religion as a solution," which is a part of politics in Europe, the similarities JDP members find between the place religious organizations have in European societies and the place they envision in Turkey are the constitutive vocabulary of a future religiously segregated-integrated Europe.[57]

A statement by Mehmet Aydın, minister responsible for Religious Affairs, ended the December 18, 2005, session of the parliament on the budget of the DRA as follows:

> One more time in both speeches there is the subject of Alevis. Every year it [this subject] comes on the agenda, and out of respect for the subject . . . issue . . . problem . . . I would like to say a few words. I always say the same thing; here a thing [duty] that does not fall upon the Directorate of Religious Affairs is demanded from it. This institution cannot solve this problem. . . . It is quite weak, and therefore, we are issuing a new law for its organization.

The minister dismissed the question of the representation of Alevis and shifted the topic to a potential new law for the restructuring of the DRA; this law passed after a heated debate in parliament in June 2010. The new law maintained the exact Kemalist relation of the DRA vis-à-vis the state, introduced a more hierarchical structure to the institution by differentiation in pay among the urban and countryside *imams*, and left the Sunnite bias of the institution intact by once again excluding all demands from Alevi organizations and members of parliament from Kurdish regions.[58] The new law even fell short of propositions of the conservative right political theoretician Ali Fuat Başgil (1893–1967), the first thinker to offer a systematic defense for an autonomous DRA in the 1950s. The new law did not take any steps toward autonomy but rather mobilized the state further to strengthen Sunnite infrastructure throughout the country, a goal that Başgil had proposed to reach through an autonomous DRA. Başgil's argument was again full of European references, and the goal was to strengthen the power of religion in society. His model was the Catholic Church. Başgil, in his memoirs, summarizes the central social role he attributes to religion in his writings:

> In western countries, organizations and institutions which control unruly youth are in place. First among them is the church. This is an organization that, without being tired or daunted, is always at work. In Switzerland, kids are taken to church almost every day until they become of school age. And, after they start school, they are taken to church twice a week under the supervision of their teacher to pray and listen to the preacher. When these kids, who grow up in such an environment, meet temptations later on, the sentiment of God he [or she] has received always constitutes a rein for him [or her].[59]

The role attributed to religion for the taming of youth goes along with admiration of the efficacy of the structure of the Catholic Church for such a purpose. Therefore, Başgil defends an autonomous DRA in order to strengthen the hold of religion on the youth in particular and spreading religion as a social bond in general. This we can find best articulated in his 1954 book, *Religion and Laiklik*. After reviewing the structure of the Catholic Church, Başgil comments as follows:

> Here dear reader, the Catholic castle [referring to the church], which communism could not demolish in Europe, has been established in this way. This is the Catholic front . . . which Fascism and the armies of Hitler could not penetrate and therefore had to reconcile with. Today, among the big religions, in terms of its worship place organization and its personnel, the most impoverished one is, regrettably, the religion of Islam. We are not going to delve into the historical and sociological causes of this impoverishment here. Let it suffice to underline two fundamental causes [of this impoverishment]. The most important one of them is that religion in the world of Islam has not parted with state control and declared its freedom against politics. According to us, the worship organization of Islam will continue to be impoverished as long as it is under the control of politics and serving politicians. Today, the only way for the worship organization of Islam to be set free from this condition and servitude is to achieve autonomy, even freedom, and in this way to part with politics and politicians. Today, the second fundamental reason for the impoverished state of the worship organization and personnel of Islam has to be sought in the constitution of the religion of Islam itself. The constitution of the religion of Islam is different from that of Christianity in an important respect: while Christianity is built upon the organization of religious personnel and offices, in Islam there is no religious personnel and offices. In Islam, a sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced Muslim can lead the religious service. . . . Without doubt, this lack [of structure of religion personnel and offices] is a superior characteristic. In this way, Islam has attained the status of the most liberal among religions, and its followers have not been subject to the rule of clerics as it has been the case in Christianity at different degrees during

history. But, on the other hand, the experience of the past two centuries has shown that the lack of worship organization and religious offices has created a lack of direction and proved to be a shortcoming.[60]

The JDP has not introduced autonomy—in other words, a move from institutional control to institutional separation—on the 2010 law for the DRA, but even if it does one day, Başgil's old proposal for a centralized, hierarchical, and autonomous DRA in order to strengthen the social role of religion suggests that the relation between democratization and such a move toward autonomy will have to be studied in empirical detail. Başgil's proposal raises many questions about the relationship between the institutional separation of religion and state and the institutional control of religion by the state with democratization. Here, it is crucial to remember Talal Asad's critique of José Casanova's tripartite division of the secularization thesis into three subtheses—(1) Differentiation of spheres; (2) Privatization of religion; and (3) Decline of the social significance of religion—and Casanova's argument that deprivatization of religion (religion becoming public) can be compatible with democracy. Asad summarizes and criticizes Casanova as follows:

> It [*Public Religions in the Modern World,* by Casanova] argues that the deprivatization of religion is not a refutation of the [secularization] thesis if it occurs in ways that are consistent with the basic requirements of modern society, including democratic government. . . . The argument is that whether religious deprivatization threatens modernity or not depends on *how* religion becomes public. If it furthers the construction of civil society (as in Poland) or promotes public debate around liberal values (as in the United States), then political religion is entirely consistent with modernity. If, on the other hand, it seeks to undermine civil society (as in Egypt) or individual liberties (as in Iran) then political religion is indeed against modernity and the universal values of the enlightenment. This is certainly an original position, but not, I would submit, an entirely coherent one. For if the legitimate role of deprivatized religion is carried out effectively, what happens to the allegedly viable part of the secularization thesis as stated by Casanova? Elements (1) and (3) are, I suggest, both undermined.[61]

Başgil's defense of separation complicates the Asad-Casanova debate even further. It points out that institutional separation, as well as the Kemalist laicist line of institutional control, can be a means both for increasing the social role of religion, where religio-moral ties become a substitute for political ties and religion policy a substitute for social and education policy, and for undermining the differentiation of spheres that neither the Casanova deprivatization perspective nor the Stepan twin toleration perspective would want to underwrite.

Here we reach the limits of the institutionalist analysis. The mobilization of both institutional control and institutional separation—understood as separation from a centralized and hierarchical religious institution—for increasing the social role of religion, we learn from the Turkish context, suggests at least two paths of research for the future of democratization. First, a sociology and an anthropology of institutions regulating the relation between state and religion could show whether institutional control and institutional separation pose differentiable alternatives as far as the social role of religion is concerned. Second, instead of just focusing on religion, an evaluation of religion infrastructure in comparison with other spheres such as education and social policy can be much more fruitful. If we shift to a relational independent variable—for example, investment in religion infrastructure in relation to investment in education infrastructure—we will better see the priorities of political actors and opportunity costs involved, and we will have gained a better analytical framework for the evaluation of democracy and secularism. The shared political will—left to right—to invest in religion infrastructure looks all the more contrary to priorities of democracy given the weak state of primary education infrastructure in Turkey and the current privatization of primary education under way.[62] Focusing on required and free public primary education is not only significant from the angle of democratic theory, but also from the angle of secularization theory, for free and compulsory education is, historically speaking, one of the institutional founding stones of secularization in Europe and in Turkey.

Justice and Development Party Politics from the Angle of "Nation-State Policies"

Hrant Dink, editor in chief of *Hürriyet,* had already been convicted for "denigration of Turkishness" under Article 301 (the Turkish penal code article limiting freedom of speech for reasons of national order) at the end of a court case initiated by a state prosecutor when he was murdered on January 19, 2007. The main response of politicians to the assassination was that this was an attack not only on a public intellectual, a member of the new left Freedom and Democracy Party, a member of the Armenian community, and the editor in chief of the only Turkish-language Armenian weekly but also an attack on the Turkish nation. Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement immediately after the assassination summarized this position: "This attack, on the person of Hrant Dink, has been on all of us, on our unity and togetherness, our repose and stability as a nation. A bullet has been fired at free thought and our democratic lives."

The circulation of nationalist and ultranationalist newspapers rose steadily following the assassination, and differences between Erdoğan's statement and the ultranationalist and nationalist right-wing newspapers were minimal. The ultranationalist *Tercüman* increased its circulation from 34,314 in the week preceding the assassination to 44,985 four weeks afterward, moving twenty-fourth to twenty-second in terms of national circulation. The nationalist *Hürriyet* jumped from a circulation of 575,541, ranked third in the country, in the week preceding the assassination to 665,956 the sixth week after the assassination, ranking first in the country in circulation (fig. 13.3). The *Tercüman* headline on January 20, 2007, read "Bu Kurşunlar Türkiye'ye" (These Bullets Are to Turkey).

Hürriyet turned Dink into a "son of the nation," providing one more instance of the significant place of family analogies in nationalist thought. The *Hürriyet* headline on January 22 read, "Türkiye Evladını böyle uğurlayacak" (Turkey's Farewell to Its Son), and the newspaper praised the funeral arrangements for Dink, using different vocabulary from the prime minister but dissolving the issue in the same crucible of nationalism.



Figure 13.3 Circulation of *Hürriyet* through the Assassination of Hrant Dink

At least 200,000 people walked in an eight-kilometer funeral procession with placards reading, "We are all Hrant Dink," "We are all Armenians," and "Murderer 301" in Turkish and in Armenian. This was twice the average attendance that a typical demonstration in defense of laiklik at Anıtkabir (the Tomb of Atatürk) would attract. For instance, the media reported that a demonstration in defense of laiklik in November 2006 at Anıtkabir was attended by approximately 127,000 people. The number of people in Dink's funeral cortège was four times the official Armenian population in Turkey, a clear sign that the support the Dink family received was not only from the Armenian community. In addition, the statements on the placards were radically antinationalist and antistatist for the nationalist Turkish context. They underscored how the state is not only insufficient but also contributes to the general lack of individual freedoms in Turkey through the Turkish penal code's Article 301. Being convicted under this article had made Hrant Dink a target for nationalists.

The responses of the Republican Peoples Party (the opposition) parliamentarians in the discussion ranged from explicit xenophobia—with statements like "Turks are becoming a minority in their homeland"[63]—to statements calling marchers in the procession strategically minded Turkish nationalists who were sending a message to the world by embracing Dink after his death. Statements at both ends of the spectrum

alleged that the goal was to ensure that Dink's assassination could not be used to push for the genocide laws under discussion in France and the United States.[64]

Justice and Development Party members were often silent, but when they spoke, their attempts to deal politically with the event produced contradictory statements, such as that the assassination should be condemned, but it is of value to the country that Trabzon, the assassin's hometown, is nationalist.[65] Regardless of party positions, all arguments and comments were headed in the direction of preserving a distinction between good and bad nationalism, qualifying the racist attack as an exceptional instance of bad nationalism and not the whole truth about nationalism.[66] They were all in denial of the simple fact that approximately four times the official Armenian population in Turkey participated in the procession; hence, the question was not simply an Armenian one. Dink's murder was clear evidence that one of the Dahlian institutional requirements of democracy, the right to freedom of speech, was not present in Turkey.

The mourning for Dink in the ultranationalist and nationalist media lasted for about a week. *Tercüman*'s headline on January 24 read, "Hepimiz Türk'üz [We are all Turkish]," and the following news article presented the participants of the procession as usurpers and abusers of Dink's funeral. *Hürriyet* headlines on January 25, 2007, announced a national survey asking the following two questions in an attempt to moralize social facts and displace public discussion from a factual to a moral register: (1) Is the slogan "We are all Armenians" right or wrong? and (2) Is it okay to recite the Al-Fatiha[67] after Dink?

Emerging evidence linking the assassin to the Turkish police, gendarme, and secret service, and the publicization of the welcoming treatment the assassin received at the police station where he was held, revealed that this nationalist reaction was deeply rooted. The police and gendarme had treated him like a hero and had photos taken with him under the Turkish flag all together. The most current evidence at the time of writing was a phone conversation between a friend of the assassin (known to be an informant for the police) and a police officer, where the officer expressed his contentment with the assassination.

While the nationalist Turkish press was trying to dissolve the issue in nationalism, the European and American press was dissolving it in Armenian diaspora politics, all placing the Turkish state versus the Armenian community opposition at the heart of their analyses but defending different sides. It was completely forgotten that Dink's public statements through his career were much more nuanced than a Turkish-Armenian binary opposition could capture. For instance, Dink joined other public intellectuals tried under Article 301 in October 2006 to oppose the French law in recognition of the Armenian genocide, because he preferred a solution by public discussion rather than by legal measures.[68]

In February 2007, eight months before the parliamentary elections, Prime Minister Erdoğan started explicitly playing on a distinction between good and bad nationalism in order to differentiate his party's position from that of the Nationalist Action Party (far right, not then in parliament). He stated, "They [the National Action Party] are not nationalist; they are racist, discriminationist headhunters. We do not say 'love it or leave it.' We say 'let the sons and daughters of this country love each other.' "[69] Yet Erdoğan neither attended the funeral of Dink nor pushed for a change in Article 301 of the penal code under which Dink was convicted. And when, during the opening reception of the Grand Assembly on October 1, 2007, the president of the Association for the Support and Education of Women Candidates for Parliament (KADER) pointed out to Prime Minister Erdoğan that in Rwanda there is a quota for women in parliament and asked him whether Turkey will ever have quotas for women in parliament, Prime Minister Erdoğan told her to go and live in Rwanda,[70] suggesting that the distinction he made between good and bad nationalism and his criticism of the slogan "love it or leave it" in February was simply election propaganda. The JDP's silence on the question of freedom of speech was striking, and it raised serious doubts about how dedicated the party was to challenging the "nation-state policy"-oriented organic state tradition in Turkey. Was this silence on such a fundamental institutional requirement of democracy to be interpreted as a "tacit consent" to the status quo, or just political prudence concerning the timing of such a change?

Simultaneously, the Republican Peoples Party, the historical founder of laik institutions, started its move to get closer to the Justice and Development Party. Respect for Atatürk and religion in schools was present among the declared election proposals of the party. This move was already visible when, during the visit of Pope Benedictus XVI in

November 2006, the leader of the Republican Peoples Party, Deniz Baykal, stated that as "social democrats" they should not dismiss religion. The RPP's claim for social democracy has never been more than lip service, and on March 22, 2007, the only counterstatement that Baykal could come up with to oppose Erdoğan's "Religion is the cement of Turkish society" was "Nationalism is the cement of our society." And the Turkish party spectrum was set before the elections from Islamist-nationalist only as far as nationalist-Islamists, proving again that party politics in Turkey is still trapped within the Turkish-Islamist synthesis instituted and defended by the military.

While party leaders were riding the rising tide of reactionary nationalism in the wake of Dink's assassination and distinguishing themselves from each other on the nationalist-Islamist spectrum, ethnic and religious-nationalist fever was finding expression at all levels in the country both in the state and in civil society. Radical right-wing civil organizations led by retired high-ranking military officers—a perfect example of the militarization of society and how organic statism is encroaching upon the nascent space of civil society in Turkey—were conducting initiation ceremonies by a pledge on a gun and the Qur'an.[71] The president of the Turkish History Association, Professor Yusuf Halaçoğlu, criticized the participants of the funeral for being ideological and so well organized that they could only have acted in such a manner by having foreknowledge of the assassination, falling just short of accusing the participants of the movement as being a party to the assassination.

With this nationalist fervor came the presidential elections of April 28, 2007. General Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt spoke on April 12 and signaled the preferences of the military to the government before the presidential elections—that the military preferred to enter northern Iraq, but the operation should be ordered by parliament.[72] On the question of the presidency, he signaled that the military wanted a president loyal to the Republic not in appearance, but in essence,[73] which in the context of the military's desire to enter Northern Iraq simply meant a president loyal to the interests of the military institution. The first matter the Justice and Development Party had to deliberate over and decide in parliament each time it took office, both in 2002[74] and in 2007, was the question of a military operation across the Iraqi border. In both

parliaments the party had more than a simple majority; therefore, the decision was in its hands. In 2002 the parliamentary decision was against the operation. The statements of the general chief of staff prior to the 2007 parliamentary elections were highly suspected of initiating a bargain between the JDP and the military on the question of an across-border operation.

From April 14 to May 13, Republican demonstrations in five cities—Ankara, Istanbul, Manisa, Çanakkale, and İzmir—were organized by the Union of National Civil Society Organizations against the candidacy of Abdullah Gül for the presidency. On the night of the first round of presidential elections, April 27, at 23:10, General Chief of Staff Headquarters issued a warning against religious threats to laiklik on their website, popularized in the media as the e-coup (electronic coup).[75] The military document referred to the presidential elections and stated that the military would take action if necessary.[76] The tension between the JDP and the military was alleviated after a secret meeting between General Chief of Staff Büyükanıt and Prime Minister Erdoğan.

In the presidential elections, Abdullah Gül was the only candidate. In the first round of elections on April 27, the attendance in parliament was less than 367, and Gül could not receive the required two-thirds majority (a two-thirds majority required 367 votes; JDP seats numbered 365). The constitution stated that a simple majority in the third round would elect the president if no candidate received a two-thirds majority in the first two rounds. In other words, even if JDP was short of a two-thirds majority, in the third round it could elect its preferred candidate. Just after the first round, the opposition party in parliament, RPP, appealed to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the first round of presidential elections on the grounds that the constitution not only specified a two-thirds majority in parliament for the election to presidency but also a two-thirds majority in parliament to be able to hold the presidential elections. For the first time in the history of Turkey, the Constitutional Court, having received the signal of the military—court decision or coup—interpreted the two-thirds majority mentioned in Article 102 as the requirement of convening and annulled the first round of elections on May 1, 2007. With this decision it became impossible for the parliament to hold an election, because

now the JDP needed the participation of at least two parliamentarians from the opposition parties in order to be able to reach the 367 seats required with the new court decision for convening, and the opposition in parliament refused. If the parliament is unable to elect a president, the constitution required parliamentary elections. The election was rescheduled for July instead of its normal time in November, and in the meantime the Justice and Development Party took advantage of the lower requirement for constitutional change (while two-thirds is required for electing a president, three-fifths is required for a constitutional change in parliament unless there is a presidential veto, which can be overturned by a two-thirds majority) and started pushing for a change in the constitution. After a constitutional change, Abdullah Gül was elected president in the first popular presidential elections of Turkey in August 2007.

When the vice general chief of staff accompanied Prime Minister Erdoğan on his November 5, 2007, U.S. visit, the coalition that had been forming between the military and the Justice and Development Party since April 2007 became blatantly public concerning the Kurdish question. After the visit, President Abdullah Gül declared in the media: "From this point on not diplomats, but soldiers will speak."[77] From a position of opposing the military on the question of an across border operation in 2002, the JDP and the ex-JDP new president converged to the military position in favor of an operation in 2007. Concomitant with the military operation was the censorship of the media on the coverage of the South East, and the head prosecutor of the republic launched a constitutional court case against the Democratic Society Party (Kurdish political party) in parliament, charging them for having members who had not yet completely broken their ties with the PKK. During the military operation across the Iraqi border in December 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated, "single nation, single patri, single flag and single state,"[78] an exact reiteration of the position of the military.[79]

Conclusion

I have argued that the current institutions of "laiklik" do not satisfy the "twin tolerations," nor are the policies of the JDP, in great contradiction to their celebrated position, pushing Turkey toward "democratic patterns of religious-state relations." They are reproducing, rather, the religion and nation-state policies bequeathed by the Kemalist military-civilian establishment. The empirical evidence I have presented on the JDP fits much better under "organic statism" than under "twin tolerations." With the victory of the JDP, Turkish democracy has proved "resilient" but only with the collaboration and co-optation of the JDP into the organic statist tradition in Turkey. I would like to suggest that at least for the case of Turkey, Stepan's analytical concept "multivocality," which asks the researcher to focus on concepts and arguments within religious traditions and texts with democratic potential, still shares *one* significant element with Huntington's view. In *The Clash of Civilizations,* Huntington writes:

> While Australia's leaders embarked on a quest for Asia, those of other torn countries—Turkey, Mexico, Russia—attempted to incorporate the West into their societies and to incorporate their societies into the West. Their experience strongly demonstrates, however, the strength, resilience, and viscosity of indigenous cultures and their ability to renew themselves and to resist, contain, and adapt Western imports. While the rejectionist response to the West is impossible, *the Kemalist response has been unsuccessful. If non-Western societies are to modernize, they must do it their own way and, emulating Japan, build upon and employ their own traditions, institutions, and values.*[80]

In his work on religion and politics, Stepan criticizes Huntington's understanding of culture as a totality,[81] which denies the possibility of democracy traveling across certain contexts. Instead, Stepan follows a Weberian "worldview" understanding of culture conveyed by Weber's switchman metaphor. In other words, although for Stepan democracy can travel to any context, sometimes he still works with the assumption that there is a distinct *"own way"* to democracy that at the least partly passes via the religious tradition in question. And he operationalizes the analysis of religious tradition as a worldview by focusing on its multivocal texts and the local agents who mobilize these texts. My analysis of Turkish politics first shows that Kemalists and Islamists have no significant difference in their respective conceptual and institutional

mobilizations of religion. If Kemalism is the "imposed way," then what is new and "own" about the Islamist way? Second, my analysis also shows that the conceptual and institutional mobilizations of religion and nationalism are better described as "organic-statist"—a concept from Stepan's earlier work—than democratization.

Notes

I would like to thank Sandrine Bertaux, Douglas A. Chalmers, Toros Korkmaz, Scott Mainwaring, Jörg Nowak, and Taha Parla for their comments and suggestions and the Boğaziçi University Research Fund (BAP 6054) for providing financial support during my research.

1. *Laiklik* is the concept used to refer to the relation of religion and state in Turkey. It denotes a condition rather than an "ism." Its parallel would be secularity and not secularism. Secularism would correspond to *laikçilik*, but this concept is not common, except for a few usages during the writing of constitutions. Whether laicism and secularism are different concepts referring to different phenomena, or simply French and English versions of the same phenomenon, is an issue of debate. See Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, "Secularism and Laicism in Turkey," in *Secularisms*, ed. Janet R. Jacobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 61; and see Jean Baubérot, "Laïcité, Laïcisation, Secularisation," in *Pluralisme religieux et laïcité dans l'Union Européenne*, ed. A. Dierkens (Bruxelles: Editions de l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1994), 9–20.

2. An international project led by Spain and Turkey to produce alternatives to the Clash of Civilizations perceptions of world politics.

3. Alfred Stepan, "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy: Crafting the 'Twin Tolerations,'" in *Arguing Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 216–17.

4. Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 25.

5. Alfred Stepan, "Liberal-Pluralist, Classic Marxist, and 'Organic Statist' Approaches to the State," in *State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 26.

6. Alevis are a minority Islamic group in Turkey. The majority of Muslims in Turkey are Sunnites. The population statistics for the Alevis are highly politicized and run between 12 million and 20 million. The total population in Turkey is more than 70 million.

7. Stepan, "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy," 222.

8. Robert A. Dahl's eight requirements are (1) freedom to form and join organizations, (2) freedom of expression, (3) the right to vote, (4) eligibility for public office, (5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, (6) alternative sources of information, (7) free and fair elections, and (8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. The two additional Linz-Stepan criteria: (9) the opportunity for the development of a robust and critical civil society and (10) a democratically written democratic constitution.

9. Stepan, "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy," 216–17.

10. Ibid., 236.

11. José Casanova, "Civil Society and Religion: Retrospective Reflections on Catholicism and Prospective Reflections on Islam," *Social Research* 68, no. 4 (2001): 1075.

12. Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, "An 'Arab' More than a 'Muslim' Democracy Gap," *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 3 (2003): 33.

13. Stepan, "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy," 225.

14. Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2003), 117.

15. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 5.

16. Ibid., 7.

17. Ibid., 25.

18. Stepan, "Liberal-Pluralist, Classic Marxist, and 'Organic Statist' Approaches to the State," 67.

19. Ibid., 59–61.

20. Alfred Stepan, "Corporatism and the State," in *State and Society*, 46–47.

21. Douglas A. Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics," in *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, ed. H. J. Wiarda (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 59–81; Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 25–34; Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?," *Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (1974): 85–131; Stepan, *The State and Society;* Ruth B. Collier and David Collier, "Inducements versus Constraints: Disaggregating: Corporatism," *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (1979): 967–86.

22. For the distinction between corporatism as a regime and as an ideology, see Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics," 63–67.

23. Parla and Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey*, viii. See also Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), 49.

24. Parla and Davison, "Secularism and Laicism in Turkey," 74.

25. Parla and Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey*, 279.

26. Air raids and state troops took the lives of civilians in Dersim in order to reinforce the nation-state.

27. This was the exact phrase used in the European Court of Human Rights decision against Refah Partisi in July 2001. It referred to the violation of the rule of one law for all citizens and the advocacy of discrimination according to religious beliefs.

28. Most of the companies that generated capital in this format have recently gone bankrupt and left their shareholders in economic deprivation.

29. Turkish Statistical Yearbook.

30. Necmettin Erbakan, *Milli Görüş* (National Perspective) (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1975), 25.

31. See the collection of essays: Toktamış Ateş, Eser Karakaş and İlber Ortaylı, eds., Barış Köprüleri: Dünyaya Açılan Türk Okulları (Bridges of Peace: Turkish Schools Opening to the World) (Istanbul: Da Yayıncılık, 2005).

32. For instance, see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964). In his conclusion on the nature of secularization in Turkey, Berkes writes, "The struggle was not over the question of separating the spiritual and the temporal, but over the difference between democracy and theocracy" (479).

33. Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," *Daedalus* (1973): 169–90.

34. Çağlar Keyder, "Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, ed. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 37–51.

35. Stepan, "The World's Religious Systems and Democracy," 245. The comparison with France has become much more complicated since the 2004 law in France banning religious symbols in public schools. The commission report in favor of a ban preceding the law has implicitly offered Kemalist laicism as a justification. In other words, recent evidence suggests that France is currently modeling itself on Turkey. For recent developments in France in historical context, see Murat Akan, "Laïcité and Multiculturalism: The Stasi Report in Context," *British Journal of Sociology* 60, no. 2 (2009): 237–56. Recent developments aside, the above comparative remark is accurate, and I take it as a starting point for the current section.

36. "Din Çimentomuz," *Radikal*, December 12, 2005.

37. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 22nd term, 4th year, 35th meeting, December 18, 2005.

38. Ibid.

39. Parla and Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey*, 110.

40. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 2nd term (vol. 7) (1924), 50, 55, 60. The term *consultation* is currently in popular usage by both scholars and moderate Muslim politicians alongside many Qur'anic terms with democratic implications in a hermeneutical attempt to democratize Islam from within. This is in no way an original moment in the history of Turkish laicization, as this quotation from 1924 suggests.

41. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 22nd term, 4th year, 35th meeting, December 18, 2005.

42. This comparative point calls for a reevaluation of the question of continuity and discontinuity between JDP and previous parties of political Islam. The empirical evidence in this article challenges the common narrative of the JDP break from the previous parties of political Islam toward a more moderate position. See Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," *Turkish Studies* 6, no. 2 (2005): 167–86, for an example of such an analysis.

43. "Diyanet bütçesi 37 kurumu solladı," *Hürriyet*, October 24, 2006.

44. *Records of the 7th Republican Peoples Party Congregation* (Ankara, 1948), 448–70.

45. Parla and Davison. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey*, 68–140.

46. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 21st term, 3rd year, 30th meeting, December 13, 2000.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 20th term, 2nd year, 31st meeting, December 12, 1996.

50. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly*, 22nd term, 4th year, 35th meeting, December 18, 2005.

51. *Proposal for Compromise on Constitutional Change by the Welfare Party* (Ankara: Semih Ofset, 1994), 25–37.

52. Erbakan, *Milli Görüş* (National Perspective), 9–10.

53. See Akan, "Laïcité and Multiculturalism"; and Murat Akan, "Governing Religious Difference or Differentiating Governance Religiously?," paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Lisbon, 2009.

54. Nicolas Sarkozy, *La République, les religions, l'espérance* (Paris: Cerf, 2004), 19.

55. "Politics, not religion, at the heart of growing Muslim-West divide, new report argues," *Alliance of Civilizations Press Release*, Fourth High Level Group Meeting, November 12–13, 2006.

56. *Alliance of Civilizations Report of the High-Level Group*, November 13, 2006, 3.

57. Étienne Balibar, "Droit de cité or Apartheid?," in *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, trans. James Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 31–50.

58. For a detailed critical analysis of the law, see Murat Akan, "'Religious' and 'Laik' Actors and the Question of Democracy in Turkey" (forthcoming).

59. Ali Fuad Başgil, *Yakın Maziden Hatıra Kırıntıları* (Crumbs of Memory from a Recent Past) (Istanbul: Yağmur Yayınevi, 2007), 25–26.

60. Ali Fuat Başgil, *Din ve Laiklik* (Religion and Laiklik) (Istanbul: Sönmez Neşriyat ve Matbaacılık, 1954), 95–96.

61. Talal Asad, "Secularism, Nation-State, Religion," in *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 182.

62. See Murat Akan, "Politics of the Veil: Towards an Infrastructural Theory of Secularism" (unpublished manuscript); Murat Akan, "Infrastructural Politics of Laiklik in the Writing of the 1961 Turkish Constitution," *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 13, no. 2 (2011): 190–211.

63. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,* 22nd term, 5th year, 55th meeting, January 25, 2007.

64. Ibid.

65. *Records of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,* 22nd term, 5th year, 56th meeting, January 30, 2007.

66. The distinction, Partha Chatterjee explains in his book *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 2–3, is made to cope with the "liberal-rationalist dilemma in talking about nationalist thought." Liberals could not deny that the history of nation-states, which Charles Tilly in his "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In,* ed. D. Rueschemeyer, P. B. Evans, and T. Skocpol (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169, described as a history of "organized crime" rather than the history of liberty and progress, but instead liberals could create some new distinctions, such as the good versus evil nationalisms, save the former and protect a liberalism-nationalism synthesis, by trying to gather all the baggage of crime under the latter. As nationalism and racism in Turkey have been reduced to psychological, lumpen, and regional (the teenage assassin comes from a city infamous for its radical nationalism) issues after the assassination of Dink, the problems of nationalism and racism in the world have been reduced to German and/or Oriental problems under the pen of liberalism. These are particularizations of the problems of nationalism and racism, which all function, according to Étienne Balibar, "Racism and Nationalism," in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities,* ed. Immanuel Wallerstein Étienne Balibar (New York: Verso, 1991), "as an alibi" (45). These distinctions are displacements, tinkering with typologies and making use of these "alibis" in order to, in the final analysis, protect nationalism as an *idée force.*

67. The first *shura* of the Qur'an.

68. "301 Mağdurları: Fransa Düşünceye Darbe Vuruyor," *Radikal,* October 9, 2006.

69. "Erdoğan: "Bunlar Irkçı ve Kafatasçı," *Radikal,* February 4, 2007.

70. "Gülbahar: Erdoğan Kotayı Kabul Etmişti," *Bianet,* October 2, 2007.

71. "Mersin'e dikkat!," *Radikal,* February 14, 2007; "'Vatanseverlik' Yarışında Örgütler Emekli Asker Dolu Al Sana 'sivil' toplum!," *Radikal,* February 17, 2007.

72. "Orgeneral Büyükkanıt 'Kuzey Irak'a girmeliyiz' deyip topu Hükümete attı," *Radikal,* April 13, 2007.

73. "Büyükanıt cumhurbaşkanı adayını tariff etti," *Radikal,* April 13, 2007.

74. Koray Çalışkan and Yüksel Taşkın, "Litmus Test: Turkey's Neo-Islamists Weigh War and Peace," *Middle East Report Online,* January 30, 2003.

75. I will not go into detail here, but this term misrepresents the military warning in 2007 as completely discontinuous with the past tradition of military takeovers and warnings in Turkey.

76. www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/BA_08.html.

77. "Gül: Artık Diplomatlar Değil, Asker Konuşacak," *Radikal,* November 7, 2007. See also "Devletin Tepesinde Sağırlar Diyaloğu," *Radikal,* June 1, 2007.

78. "Erdoğan Fena Patladı," *Internet Haber,* December 27, 2007.

79. The secretary of the National Security Council—the institution through which the military dictates its preferences to the government—on June 1, 1997, during the peak of the events, referred to the operation as the "postmodern coup," and in his speech on the anniversary of the founding of the Council had listed as the main features of the *laik* state: "Everyone should know that the fundamental features of the modern and *laik* state founded by Atatürk will not change and will not be changed. These features are single patri, single nation, single state, single language and single flag. Let this be known." See Demokrasi Kararlılığı," *Milliyet,* June 1, 1997.

80. Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 154; emphasis added.

81. For culture as totality, see Murat Akan, "Contextualizing Multiculturalism," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 38, no. 2 (2003): 58.

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